- Project cost had increased from Rs.1800 Crore to Rs.4000 Crore within two years.  One can understand increase in project costs from 5 to 10%every year.  How can it increase more than 100% in two years? Who are responsible for this?

- Medigadda being a barrage, contractors having experience of barrage construction should have been involved. But it was not done.  Select contractors were picked up for the barrage on the basis of their experience in laying the pipelines and on bogus qualifications! 

stand vindicated

Justice Ghose Commission made  observations in its final report. But yet there are some unanswered questions.

- Will the government order a CID, ACB, SIT inquiry? Will it if need be, order IT, CBI, ED, FEMA violations case incase of money laundering at foreign shores?

- Will the government initiate criminal proceedings against the accused and arrest and interrogate them?

- Will the government blacklist L&T for its acts of Omissions and Commissions Like the Kerala government did in case of KNR Constructions? L&T is also given road works for the prestigious Future City despite their poor performance in KLIS.

- What about other engineers, senior officers in the finance department who approved the bills and funds? Will the government take action them?

- Will there be any concrete action against the culprits or will is be used as a mere political weapon against the BRS as opined by a section of the people.

What Rajam observed then...

- On October 26 in Metro India edition, Chairman CL Rajam had rightly pointed out the major lapses in Kakatiya Lift Irrigation Scheme in an exclusive article titled Medigadda Myth Busted, He also suggested some remedies. 

- Complete the geological study and get report of National Dam Safety panel for rectification of the structure.

- Old officers are to be immediately shifted from the project and new people and contractor should be engaged for the rectification.

- Chief engineer of C.D.O. should have experience in design for at least ten years and only such a person should be posted as CE (CDO).

- Take action against the responsible officers.

- Recover 30% profit earned by the contractors.

- Start repair work at least from Dec’2024, on the basis of national DAM Safety Panel, including dismantling three blocks, strengthening/new diaphragm and cut off walls, extending the apron etc.,

- A white paper should be published on the problems faced, solutions etc., for future projects in the country and abroad.

- Institute enquiry committee, why the tender cost increased from Rs.1800 crores  to Rs.4000 crores.

- Make enquiry and take action against WABCOS, Central Govt., design organization, why the DPR prepared without Geological/Hydrological investigation, despite receiving Rs.13 crores from State.  State should consider blocklisting of WABCOS consultancy firm, and also proceed with criminal investigation.

- Right from the beginning, there were lapses- project estimates were high, tenders and pre-qualifications were drafted that qualification of contractors was done on the basis of experience in laying of pipelines but not that of barrages. Limiting bidders has resulted in not discovering the correct market price.Only a few bidders were entertained and the work was awarded to L1 with an amount of Rs.1800 Cr.

- The then Chief Minister  Kalvakuntla Chandrasekhar Rao unduly interfered, acted as a self-styled engineer, instead of working as Chief Minister.  The contractors acted behind the scenes. Engineers did not exercise their professional duties. Faulty design is the major cause for collapse, added by the poor construction & maintenance. Tenders were awarded without investigation; DPR and the estimation was pegged at higher rates.  It is a clear-cut case of system failure.

metro india news  I hyderabad

Executive Summary

The Commission of Inquiry, led by Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose, was appointed to investigate allegations of "negligence, irregularities and lacunae in Planning, Designing and Construction" of the Medigadda, Annaram, and Sundilla Barrages of the Kaleshwaram Project, including financial irregularities, contract execution, and operation & maintenance (O&M).

The report concludes with a scathing indictment, finding rampant procedural and financial irregularities, lack of proper planning,designflaws, construction defects, and a complete absence of effective operation and maintenance.

The report pins significant responsibility on key political and administrative figures, particularly the then Chief Minister, for direct involvement and disregard for established procedures, resulting in colossal public expenditure and the current distress of the barrages.

1. Irregularities in Planning and Conceptualization

Sole Decision of the Chief Minister: 

The decision to construct the barrages at Medigadda, Annaram, and Sundilla was "the sole and individual decision of the Minister (Irrigation) and the Chief Minister." There was no formal" decision of the Government" in this regard.

Suppression of Expert Reports:

An Expert Committee, constituted under G.O. Rt. No. 28, dated 21.1.2015, explicitly rejected the proposal to construct a barrage at Medigadda due to “prohibitive cost andtime consumption” and suggested alternatives like Vemanapally. This report was “intentionally... not considered” and “kept in cold storage” by the then Chief Minister and Minister for Irrigation.

 Misleading Justification forSite Shift: 

The claim of “noavailability of water at Tummidi Hetti” as the reason for shifting the barrage location to Medigadda "does not appear to be sincere and honest."

Lack of Cabinet Approval:

Initial administrative approvals for the construction of the three barrages (G.O. Rt. Nos. 231, 232, and 233 on 1.3.2016) were not placed before or approved by the Cabinet, violating Government Business Rules.

The then Chief Minister's letter to the Prime Minister on 11.2.2016 mentioned the Kaleshwaram project cost as Rs.71,436 crores, even before WAPCOS's final DPR submission.

2. Award and Execution of Contract Lump Sum, Not Turnkey:

Despite CWC's advice for “turnkey basis” for construction and maintenance, the contracts were awarded on a "lumpsum" basis.

Unjustified Revised Administrative Approvals (RAA I & II): 

RAA I (May 2018): Justified by alleged "variations" due to shifted barrage locations (Annaram and Sundilla), increased length, flood banks, and design changes.

• The decision to shift Annaram and Sundilla barrage locations by the HighPower Committee on 22.10.2016 was done after contracts were concluded in July / August 2016, and "without consulting WAPCOS."

RAAII(2021-2022): 

Further increased project costs, with reasons including “increased quantities, change in specification, design and drawings, duly incorporatingthe additional items of work such as staff quarters, guest house... slope protection works... and including all taxes and escalation."

• The proposals for RAA I and II were made with “malicious intention to unduly favour the Agencies” and "wrongfully syphoning the amounts from public exchequer."

 3. Negligence and Lacunae in Operation & Maintenance(O&M) Complete Absence of O&M:

There was "absolutely no operation and maintenance of whatsoever nature, including periodical checks / inspections, pre and post monsoon inspections and reports, etc., of these three barrages at any time."

Continuous Impounding of Water: 

The then Chief Minister directed continuous impounding of waterin the barrages to theirfull capacity for lifting waterthrough pump houses, even though barrages are typically “diversion structures with low head, not as storage structures.” This continuous impounding was a “major cause for distress.”

4. Quality Control & Monitoring and Defects

Design Deficiencies: 

The barrages, designed on “permeable foundations,” were “utilized as storage structures,” which is against standard practice.

• Crucial studieslike “back water studies, tail waterrating curves, G-D curves and geophysical investigation were not done" at the shifted Annaram and Sundilla locations.

Inadequate Quality Control: 

“The quality control aspects are observed to be inadequate in case of this most important component of these barrage structures (secant piles).” For secant piles, verticality checks were merely recorded as "yes" without measurements.

5. Undue Favours to Agencies / Contractors Wrongful Completion Certificates: 

The issuance of "Substantial Construction Completion Certificate" (9.9.2019) and “Certificate of Completion of Works” (15.3.2021) for Medigadda barrage was "wrong, illegal and tainted with malice to do undue favour to the Agency,"as works were not fully completed and defects were known.

 Financial Implications Massive Cost Overruns: 

The project, initially conceived at Rs. 38,500 crores for PCSS, escalated to Rs. 71,436 crores for Kaleshwaram(as per CM's letter in 2016), and later saw revised administrative approvals totalling over Rs. 1,10,248.48 crore by March 2022.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The Commission concludes that the entire project was characterized by “rampant and brazen procedural and financial irregularities.” It calls for:

Recovery of Funds: 

Recovery of Rs. 677.67 lakhs (paid to WAPCOS) from responsible officials, as WAPCOS's report was "brushed aside."

Investigation of Collusion:

Explicitly states that "the Project authorities and the Agency are hand in glove with each other and acted with concerted malicious intention in pursuit of their unfair and ulterior motive to unduly benefit out of, and make unlawful gain from, the huge amount of public money expended on the construction of Medigadda barrage."

The report underscores that the Kaleshwaram project, intended as a "lifeline of the State of Telangana," became a colossal waste of public money due to a profound failure of governance, planning, technical oversight, and financial discipline, driven by the individual decisions and undue influence of political leadership.

Responsibilities and Accountability 

Then Chief Minister  (K. Chandrasekhar Rao):

Held “directly and also vicariously accountable for the irregularities and the illegalities in planning, construction, completion, operation and maintenance of the three barrages.” His “involvement and directions minutely... is the cause and result of irregularities and the cause of distress to these three barrages."

Then Minister for Irrigation (T. Harish Rao): 

Along with the Chief Minister, "intentionally have not considered the Report of the Expert Committee."

Then Minister for Finance (Eatala Rajender): 

Demonstrated “lack of commitment and integrity in safeguarding the financial and economic health of the newly formed State,” pleading ignorance of crucial financial decisions related to the project.

S K Joshi (IAS,Principal Secretary to Government, I&CAD Department / Chairman of KIPCL):

 Liable for suppressing the Expert Committee Report, violating Business Rules in administrative approvals, and for the failures of KIPCL.

 Smita Sabharwal (IAS, Additional Secretary / Secretary to Chief Minister):

 Held"not diligent, is negligent and irresponsible in the discharge of her duties" for failing to ensure Business Rules compliance regarding cabinet approvals.

C. Muralidhar (Engineer-in-Chief (Irrigation) / Chairman of State Level Standing Committee / Member of High Power Committee): 

Liable for suppressing the Expert Committee Report, providing false information to CWC, proposing malicious revised estimates, and failing in O&M.

B. Hari Ram (Chief Engineer, PCSS Project / Managing Director, KIPCL):

 Liable for suppressing the Expert Committee Report and providing false information to CWC. Despite being MD of KIPCL, he disclaimed knowledge of the barrages.

Specific engineers like N.Venkateswarlu (CE, Kaleshwaram Project), K.Sudhakar Reddy (CE, Ramagundam), Sardar Omkar Singh (EE), and others are singled out for negligence, dishonesty, or perjury.

B. Nagender Rao

• Designation: Engineer-in-Chief (O&M)

•Findings:

• Failed absolutely incarrying out O&M duties from 1.1.2021 onwards.

• Attempted to absolve himself of responsibility and shift blame.

• Liable for perpetuating damage to all three barrages.

• Held responsible for failure in both O&M and quality assurance

T.Pramila

• Designation: Chief Engineer, State Dam Safety Organization

• Findings:

•Found ignorant of the basic responsibilities of her post.

• Failed in dam safety duties and periodic inspections.

• Held liable for non-performance as per Dam Safety Act 

- B. Hari Ram, Chief Engineer

- A. Narender Reddy, ChiefEngineer,  

- KSS Chandra Sekhar SE, CDO,

- Basavaraju, EE, CDO-

- T.Srinivas, Chief Engineer

- Omkar Singh, Executive Engineer

- G. Anil Kumar 

- J. Sridevi, CE, TSERL